SYRIA TURNS ON ISIS?! Allies Betrayal SHOCKS the World.

A chilling invitation is set to unfold in Washington on November 10, 2025: a formal reception for Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Julani. The occasion? To officially welcome Syria into the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. This unprecedented move – the first time a Syrian head of state will be received at the White House – has ignited a firestorm of disbelief and outrage.

“The U.S. once had a five-million-dollar bounty on al-Julani’s head,” recalls Charbel, a Syrian Christian who spent four years battling ISIS alongside the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). His voice trembled with disbelief. “And now…he’s invited to the White House? How can this be?” The question hangs heavy, echoing the bewilderment felt by many who fought against the very ideology al-Julani represents.

Al-Sharaa rose to power leading a coalition that ousted Bashar al-Assad in late 2024. Yet, for years, he was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, and his organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), remained on the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization list until just months ago. This abrupt shift in policy has left allies questioning the rationale behind embracing a figure steeped in extremism.

For the Kurds and Christians of Rojava, northern Syria, Washington’s overture feels like a profound betrayal. A Kurdish woman in Qamishli voiced the sentiment of many: “He wants to join the coalition because the Americans are pushing it, but how can he fight ISIS when he *is* ISIS?” The irony is stark, the logic seemingly impossible.

The skepticism is rooted in a brutal reality. Al-Julani’s government is viewed as inherently unsafe, offering no sanctuary to minorities. Charbel’s assessment is blunt: “This government is not good. It’s not safe for anyone. No one can live there.” He refers to areas now under the control of a regime increasingly integrating former al-Qaeda and ISIS members into its ranks – jihadists rebranded as statesmen.

The recent past is stained with bloodshed. In early 2025, over 800 civilians, predominantly from the Alawite minority, were massacred across Latakia, Tartus, and Hama by militias aligned with the new government. Weeks later, similar sectarian attacks claimed hundreds of Druze lives. The perpetrators – government troops, ISIS cells, or extremist militias – were often indistinguishable, their identities blurred by a collapsing moral order.

While Rojava, protected by the SDF and remaining U.S. troops, remains relatively secure, ISIS-linked attacks are escalating, particularly in Deir ez-Zor and the Raqqa countryside. Sleeper cells are reactivating, demonstrating a chilling resilience. Despite losing territorial control, an estimated 1,500 to 3,000 ISIS fighters persist in Iraq and Syria, waging a highly adaptable insurgency.

Their methods are ruthless: assassinations, ambushes, and improvised explosive devices designed to destabilize both SDF- and government-held areas. The threat is further amplified by the dire conditions in camps like al-Hol and Roj, overflowing with over 8,000 ISIS detainees and 38,000 family members, where radicalization festers unchecked.

The numbers paint a grim picture. In 2025 alone, ISIS has already carried out 117 attacks in northeast Syria, surpassing the total for the previous year. This surge coincides with a significant U.S. troop drawdown, from 2,000 to roughly 700, weakening vital coordination and intelligence sharing. The attacks are increasingly brazen and deadly.

The threat extends beyond the battlefield. ISIS continues to exploit the digital realm, radicalizing youth through encrypted social media and online propaganda. Teenagers as young as 14 are being arrested for ISIS-inspired plots, highlighting the speed and stealth of online radicalization. The group also utilizes cryptocurrencies and the dark web to finance its operations, evading traditional financial controls.

ISIS has transformed into a decentralized global network, with affiliates expanding in Africa, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. IS-Khorasan stands out as the most aggressive branch. Across the Sahel region of Africa, ISIS’s provincial command boasts up to 3,000 fighters, while its presence in Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin is rapidly growing.

As the U.S. and Europe reduce their financial and military commitments, jihadist groups are filling the void, while Moscow and Beijing exploit the instability to advance their own agendas. Analysts warn that prioritizing geopolitical competition over counterterrorism risks enabling ISIS’s resurgence, particularly in vulnerable regions like Syria and the Sahel.

The impending arrival of al-Julani in Washington has left many Syrians, particularly those who have suffered the most under extremist rule, grappling with a fundamental question: how can the West justify legitimizing a man who once embodied the very terror the coalition was formed to defeat? The answer, for many, remains elusive and deeply unsettling.